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In this issue: 
• Moldovan Government meeting 
international donors in Brussels: 
why was it so important?  
• 2.6 billion USD to Moldova: 
conditions apply? 
• Scientific estimates confirm big 
losses of grapes harvest; 
• Industry: warming up due to cold 
winter; 
• Households: averse to consume 
more? 
• Unemployment: going up with no 
reversal signs so far; 
• Non-Performing Loans: from bad 
to worse; 
• Moldova’s foreign trade: 
continues recovering; 
 
• No time wasted on guessing the most important event/evolution in March: 
Moldovan government meeting the donors in Brussels on March 24-25, 2010. 
And it is not all about money, even though the funds pledged, a handsome 2.6 
bln. USD aid package, is significant (although significant sums were pledged a 
couple of years ago to the Communist government, too). It is also an 
important gesture of recognizing brightening outlook for Moldova following so 
far successful government’s efforts of halting the most damaging effects of 
the economic crisis and tentative reform efforts amid uncertain political and 
economic developments. The donors’ decision is also an outcome of an 
efficient diplomatic offensive conducted by Moldova in preceding months and 
the fact that Moldovan government did not come just hat-in-hand. Indeed, the 
“Rethink Moldova” report offers a coherent and comprehensive development 
framework, setting clear mid-term development priorities (varying from 
governance and administration reforms to infrastructure projects) and with 
reform costs’ estimates (almost 2.6 bln. Euros for 2010-2013 timeframe). 
• Although Moldovan officials have been adamant to avoid recognizing any 
strings attached to this bonanza, we can easily fathom at least two of them. 
First of all, Moldova’s absorption capacity and ability to use these funds 
efficiently will be an upmost factor determining donor community’s decision 
whether to disburse the money at full (or even add some more funds to match 
completely government’s financing needs) or halt the process as result of 
inadequate use of resources, as sometimes happened in previous years. 
Secondly, although the donor community decided to support Moldova (and 
implicitly the current government) in the times of heightened political 
instability, this is clearly not a mandate for political and constitutional changes 
that would transgress the rule of law principle. In other words, the governing 
alliance may put forwards whatever political reforms it wants with only 
condition: the law should be respected. And this hints at certainty of the early 
parliamentary elections. 
• Equally important, the donors’ conference was followed by the second round 
of negotiations on the Association agreement between the EU and Moldova. 
The implementation of this Agreement will undoubtedly require significant 
efforts from Moldova, especially in the areas of Justice, Freedom and Security 
as well as inter-sector cooperation that are full of institutional snags and 
where special interests’ resistance will be the strongest. Undeniably, 
implementation of the “Rethink Moldova” framework will decisively 
contribute to the implementation of the Association agreement pre-
conditions, leading to a sort of synergy between these two efforts. This means 
the implementation of the Association agreement features similar risks and 
opportunities. Moldova should and can accomplish more than formally 
envisaged, but for this matter it has to deliver on its promises. Do not forget 
that renewed donor support and Association agreement negotiations come at 
somewhat difficult times for the EU itself as well as at times when Ukraine, 
Moldova’s bigger neighbor, initially more-advanced in its euro-aspirations is 
now teetering on the brink of falling back into Russian sphere of influence. So 
more is the pressure on Moldova to match its words with deeds. In fact, will 
there ever be a better chance?  
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GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
• Moldovan economy surpassed Governmental, IMF and our expectations in 
the last quarter of 2009. The economy declined in the fourth quarter by 2.4% 
y-o-y (Chart 1), a much lower indicator than in the first three quarters of the 
year (7% y-o-y). This “positive” evolution is indeed partly favored by lower 
comparison base (GDP in the last quarter of 2008 started falling when the 
global economic crisis already showed its first effects on the Moldovan 
economy). Overall, in 2009 the GDP declined by 6.5% compared to the 
predicted 7-8% decline by the Government and 9% decline according to the 
IMF forecasts. 
• The Gross Value Added (GVA) decreased in the last quarter by 3.3% 
compared to 10% decline in the previous quarter. However, the annual value 
of GVA remained 6.4% lower than in 2008, with industrial and construction 
sector contributing most significantly to the decline, by 2.7 and 1.4 
percentage points, respectively. This is not surprising, given the dependence 
on the external demand (of the processing industry) and domestic demand 
(of the construction sector, especially housing). 
• Some moderate progresses were registered on the GDP expenditure side as 
well. The moderate stabilization of remittances in November and December 
2009 influenced final consumption of the households, which decreased only 
by 2.2% in the last quarter, compared to values around 10% in the first three 
quarters. The already low base of comparison in the last quarter of 2008 
brought some effects as well. However, the decline in consumption is 
estimated to have ended based on data on retail trade and services rendered 
to the population in the first two months of 2010 and we estimate a 
moderate increase in consumption in Q1’10. 
• Gross capital formation decreased by 31.3% in 2009, but registering a 
sizeable progress in the last quarter. Both gross fixed capital formation and 
inventories grew (Chart 2) indicating positive expectations of the companies 
and a positive change in the aggregate demand starting with the third 
quarter. Thus, in the last quarter the gross fixed capital formation reached 
81.9% compared to the similar period of 2008; at the same time, change in 
inventories was more significant than in the early 2008. 
• The evolutions in Q4’09 show that the main elements of GDP formation are 
close to the values in Q4’08. This suggests that the economic situation is on 
stabilization path; however, in order to reach the pre-crisis level Moldova will 
need few more years. Moreover, in the short-run it will be impossible to 
change the model of economic growth in Moldova, and, with the bank sector 
unable to finance large capital investment, final consumption is expected to 
remain the main engine of economic growth in short-run. 
  
 
Chart 1. Quarterly evolution of GDP, GVA and final 
consumption of households in 2009, %, y-on-y 
 





Chart 2.  Change in inventories and gross fix capital 
formation in 2009 
 
Source: EG calculations based on NBS data 
AGRICULTURE 
• Preliminary assessments conducted by specialists from the Institute for 
Horticulture and Food Technologies confirmed what we were much 
concerned of in the previous issues of the Real Economy: last winter lower-
than-average air temperatures sizably undermined of grapes harvest outlook 
(Chart 3). Harsh climate is estimated to have undermined grapes harvest by 
around 15-20%, with table grapes suffering a more severe blow (up to -40%) 
than wine grapes (up to -15%). So far, no scientific estimates have been done 
on the impact of frost on fruits, but we expect here heavy losses too. 
• A country visit conducted by a delegation of Nestle corporation – the world 
biggest food producer - to Moldova was an event which is remarkable by any 
Chart 3 Likely decline of the grapes harvest as result 
of extremely cold weather in January–February 2010 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry 
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account. The incumbent government invited Nestle to make investments in 
Moldova. As investment climate conditions were a central point of 
discussion, we do not expect Nestle coming in the country quite soon. But 
when Nestle comes, it will engender systemic changes into the Moldovan 
agriculture, which are likely to be felt almost immediately and deeply. 
• Policy discussions were framed along three main issues: 1) governmental 
promises of “freezing” tax debts of farmers to the state and social insurance 
budgets; 2) regulations regarding the agriculture subsidies; and 3) exclusive 
rights of brandy exports. Regarding the first issue, the bottom line conclusion 
is straightforward: when you start fiscal amnesties (and Moldova had many in 
the recent decade or so), it is difficult to stop them. On the second issue, we 
expected that new rules adopted by the Ministry of Agriculture for subsidies 
provision would be effectively enforced, but there are emerging signs that 
the performance related criteria (such as would-be-beneficiary being part of 
a professional or sector association and presenting a credible business-plan) 
are likely to turn to formal. On the third issue, we do not have yet all details 
for the picture to be completely clear. Indeed, is it ok that one company has 
exclusive rights of exporting brandy from the Aroma JSC to the Russian 
market? As a short-term measure, probably it can be accepted, but in long-
term it is certainly a sub-optimal arrangement. We will however dig more 
into this issue to understand what it is going on here. 
 
INDUSTRY 
• Little interesting for the moment in this sector. New statistical data released 
confirmed by and large what we claimed in the issue no.12 of the REAL 
ECONOMY: God thanks we have cold winter which increases demand for 
thermal and electric energy (with production increasing by 11.4% in Jan-
Feb‘10) and thus gives an overall good impression on the entire industrial 
sector (+4.1%).  
• The mining and quarrying industry remained deeply in red in Jan-Feb’10 (-
64% y-o-y) with little positive signs so far. This reflects the “vegetative” 
situation in the constructions sector. Other two sectors upstream to 
construction and which have fared much poorer in February than in January 
are production of metal articles (mostly used in constructions) and 
production of non-metaliferous articles (standing for construction materials, 
such as cement, bricks, tiles and others alike).  
• Aside from mining sub-sector, other two worst performers are production of 
medical equipment and precision tools (with outlook only getting poorer in 
February and March) and metallurgy. But the entire manufacturing industry 
improved a bit, from 1.7% y-o-y in Jan’10 to 2.3% in Jan-Feb’10. On the bright 
side there are production of the alcoholic beverages and tobacco products 
(Chart 4), where growth rates hit spectacular highs.  
Chart 4 Top-3 and bottom-3 industrial branches by 




INVESTMENT AND CONSTRUCTIONS 
• There are no new statistical data related to constructions and investment but 
there are no visible signs of situation getting any better either. Government 
adopted a decision to create a Working Group to analyze the constructions 
sector and advance solutions. In Moldovan political tradition, Working Groups 
are most often created when the Government has no tools, resources or will 
to really get involved. Main problem of the sector is just as clear as 
complicated to solve: lack of liquidities to get the unfinished sites completed. 
With banking sector being risk-averse, and especially, constructions-averse, 
there are no indeed quick solutions in sight for the construction companies. 
Money from abroad in form of direct investment and bank loans are 
indispensable. Equally indispensable is to put in place a functional mortgage 
system to stimulate the demand for residential real estate.  
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SERVICES 
• In March only statistical data on transport sector were available for analysis. 
The bottom line conclusion based on these data is that transport activity is not 
even bottoming out, leaving apart recovering to pre-crisis levels (Chart 5). In 
Feb’10 the volume of cargoes increased 33% compared on Jan’10, but it 
represented only two thirds of the cargoes volume transported in Feb’09, 
when the crisis was fully-fledged. On the other hand, the total distance 
covered by cargo transporters has significantly increased which means that 
Moldovan exporters are targeting remoter markets. This conclusion pertains 
only to road and air transport, while railroad transport services seem less 
flexible in this regard. 
Chart 5. Growth rate of the cargo and passenger 




• Despite the general economic situation “improving” in the last quarter of 
2009, labor market indicators continued negative trends. Employment rate in 
the fourth quarter of 2009 decreased by 2.3 p.p. y-o-y (Chart 6), reaching 
historical lows. At the same time, the crisis affected differently different age 
groups. The most vulnerable was the population aged 35-54, with the number 
of employed decreasing by 6%. At the same time, those aged 25-34 were less 
exposed, which suggest that, despite difficulties in finding a job, this 
generation seems more flexible to keep their jobs. 
• The decrease of employed population was more significant in the economic 
sectors mostly exposed to the economic crisis: construction (-16.1%), 
transport and communication (-10.3%) and agriculture (-12.7%), due to the 
less favorable weather conditions in 2009 compared to 2008. 
• Other data reflecting the fragile situation on the labor market in late 2009 are 
the underemployment rate and the share of discouraged individuals in the 
inactive population. Both indicators increased in Q4’09: underemployment 
rate registered 7.9% (1 p.p. more than in Q4’08) and the share of discouraged 
individuals in inactive population increased to 2%, a three-year height. 
• The unemployment rate almost doubled in the last quarter of 2009 compared 
to Q4’08 and reached 6.2%. Both NBS and National Employment Agency data 
show that men were more affected than women, which is a reflection of the 
crisis-mostly affected economic sectors employing more men. Moreover, NEA 
data show a continuous increase in the number of registered unemployed in 
the first two months of 2010 (Chart 7), indicating that the crisis is still rampant 
on the labor market. 
 
Chart 6. Employment rate, unemployment rate and 




Chart 7. Unemployed individuals registered at 
National Employment Agency
 
Source: National Employment Agency 
HOUSEHOLDS’ INCOME 
• The wages in the real sector increased by 3.5% in the first two months of the 
year. In some economic sectors where the recovery has been slower (mining 
and quarrying and construction), but also in those where some growth in 
output has been registered lately (electrical and thermal energy, gas and 
water) the salaries continued to decrease. In some sectors – such as 
processing industry, retail trade, transport and communications, financial 
activities – the first signs of economic growth resumption are associated with 
a slight increase in wages. However, a higher growth of the wages is expected 
only when economy starts rebounding stronger. 
• The evolution of wages in the budgetary sector during 2009 was brighter, as 
these increased by 8.5% due to administrative wage increases in the 
educational and health sectors. In public administration sector the wages 
dropped by 3.7% as a result of cuts in wage supplements. For 2010 no 
significant wage increases are expected in the budgetary sector due to the 
austere budgetary policy adopted by the Government. 
 
 
Chart 8. Remittances’ growth by currency, %, y-o-y 
 
Source: EG calculations based on NBM data 
• After the significant decrease of remittances in early 2009, in January 2010 the 
decline was only 1.5% compared to January 2009. Thus, a slight stabilization of 
remittances is already achieved and in the following months, e
might be registered, especially before spring holidays. The 
remittances in Euro already increased by almost 9%, while the transfers in USD 
decreased by 12% (Chart 8), reflecting 
Western Europe and slower recovery in CIS countries.
HOUSEHOLDS’ CONSUMPTION  
• Retail trade volume rose two months in a row, but 
rate was lower than in January: 0.3% as 
This positive evolution is in line with the stabilization of the remittances 
this year and is expected to serve as main engine of the 
the Q1’10. Mirroring the 2009 trends, the 
2%, while non-food retail trade decreased by 0.8% in Feb
• Also, in Feb’10 the volume of services rendered to the population increased 
by 8.5% y-o-y. The most significant growth 
recovery started earlier, while in the central and north
amount of services rendered to the population is still under the 2009 level
• In Feb’10 consumer credit dropped again by about 25% 
after a slight stabilization in Dec’09 and Jan
increase in interest rates for consumer credits on average by 0.3 p.p. in 
February compared to January, as banks are inclined to cover 
loans by higher margins on the on-going credits
• On the other hand, the interest rates for the 
Therefore, despite the first signs of remittances’ stabilization, 
deposits registered in Feb’10 a decrease for the second month
PRICES 
• Inflationary pressures continued escalating 
annual CPI and 2.1% increase in comparison with the previous month. The 
foodstuffs contributed 0.9 p.p. to the monthly CPI, followed by services (+0.7 
p.p.) and non-food products (+0.5 p.p.).  
• As the NBM mentioned in a public statement
inflationary trend exceeding the targeted corridor 
year on the ground of expected increase
imported inflation and growing production 
the 12-month core inflation, which can be dire
bank, was only 4.3% - fitting well in the targeted corridor of 5% (
• The soaring foodstuffs inflation was mainly
prices for vegetables and 51.8% hike in prices for sugar
In the first case, it was conditioned by increasing storage costs, while in the 
second case – by the poor harvest previous year.
• Increasing administrative prices (electricity 
by 5.8%) reflected in growing costs (Cha
expectations.  
• Other major culprits for soaring prices were a 
currency against US dollar and increasin
Imported inflation propagated mainly via fuel
• The 9.2% increase in monetary mass (M3), in annual terms, reveals the 
monetary pressures on the price level –
internal and external demand (Chart 11).
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Chart 10 CPI and IPPI for domestic products, y
Source: NBS 
 








• For the next few months the inflationary pressures will be mainly generated 
by new waves of price increases for imported natural gas, imported inflation 
(fuels, vegetables), and unfavorable climate conditions whi
influence the harvest, drive up production costs and, finally, will fuel 
inflationary expectations. On its turn, the 
challenges through a gradual and equilibrated 
policy, without threatening the fledgling economic growth.
BUDGETARY AND FISCAL POLICY 
• In Feb’10 signs of stabilization of public finances
decreasing fiscal gap on the ground of converging annual growth rates of 
public revenues and public expenditures. 
prerequisite to lessen the budgetary deficit (
• The annual increase in public revenues by 6.3% was determined mainly by the 
increase in indirect taxes: VAT receipts (+13.7), excises (22.3%) and custom 
duties (+0.4%). At the same time, the revenues from payroll taxes decreased 
by 1.0%, revealing that, despite increase in domestic and external demand, 
stabilization of the Moldovan economy is hardly a 
• The total public expenditures increased 
the previous year. It was traditionally driven by expenditures for social 
assistance (+13.4%), health care (+0.4%) and education (+19.8%). However, 
due to the increase in public revenues, the pension bill and the wage bill in 
public sector is no longer a major challenge for the Government. 
• The real challenge for the budgetary policy is related to managing the 
increasing internal and external public debt and tackling its effects on the 
economy. During the first two months of 2010
bills was 3 times higher in comparison with the previous year (MDL 1130.1 
mil.). It is worth stressing that the concept of borrowing now 
and taxing later, aside from its short-term benefits, generates long
since it disguises the true costs of the government, 
investment and undermines sustainability of the 
MONETARY POLICY 
• During February-March 2010, the NBM 
monetary policy, on the grounds of the necessity to steer inflation towards the 
targeted level without undermining the fledgling economic growth 
for 2010. Thus, for the second time in 2010 it increased its policy rate by 1 p.p. 
given the soaring inflationary expectations and the increase in CPI above the 
targeted level. In the same time, NBM keeps stable the obligatory reserves 
rate for not hampering the liquidity levels in the banking system. 
• Given the NBM commitment to handle monetary inflationary pressures, it 
continued to massively issue NBM certificates 
As result, NBM strengthened its position of 
selling in Feb’10 MDL 3.014,9 mil. per day
• In Feb’10, the central bank increased its interventions on the foreign
market, leading to the sterilization of an equivalent of USD 39.1 mil. in 
national currency. It was determined by the increasing demand for foreign 
currency coming from importers. 
• The monetary mass (M3) increased in Feb
one hand, it generates additional inflationary pressures, motivating the cen
bank to operate liquidity sterilization, and, on the other hand, it augurs for a 
sluggish rebound in domestic and external demand 
ch will negatively 
NBM will have to address these 
tightening of the monetary 
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Chart 12 Budget revenues and expenditures
growth, %, y-o-y 
Source: Ministry of Finance
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• In Feb’10 banks remained averse about lending given the high uncertainty 
regarding the financial perspectives of debtors
and growing non-performing loans (NPL)
almost, the entire real sector is at the mercy of banks and the whole economy 
needs liquidities as an oxygen mask. In order to 
for spurring lending activities, the NBM policy should not affect the liquidity 
indicators in the banking system, while 
insolvency regulatory framework, ease the implementation of judicial 
decisions, liberalize land market and ensure macroeconom
predictability. 
• The banking system “intoxication” remains among 
the current financial crisis. In Feb’10, the 
reached 17.81% (Chart 14). This further 
indicators of commercial banks and dented 
and growing share of NPL motivated commercial banks to increase the risk 
premiums and keep the banking spread high enough to finance their 
conservative risk-management.  
• Despite the decreasing rates for deposits in national currency (from 9.7% in 
Jan to 8.6% in Feb’10), the interest rates for credits rose from 17.0% in 
January up to 17.8% in February 2010 (Chart 
credits in national currency was only 77.1% of the level registered previous 
year. At the same time, the rebounding 
companies for credits in foreign currency for import operations, so that the 
volume of credits in foreign currency was 10.6% above the level registered 
previous year.  
• For the next few months, the commercial banks will have the possibility to 
decrease the interest rates on credits taking int
spread between deposit and credit rates and economic recovery anticipated 
for Q2’10. The gradual increase in monetary policy rate operated by NBM 
not likely to create adverse effects for the “money
banks. Liquidity remains abundant (0.61 for long
short-term liquidity) to attenuate the faults of the weak 
mechanisms for the monetary policy. 
FOREIGN TRADE 
• In January 2010 Moldova’s foreign trade continued to recover. Thus, exports 
increased by 18.7%, while imports almost 
data show that exports appear to be on a firm ground, enjoying improved 
foreign outlook and lower comparative base, being also helped by Moldovan 
Leu depreciation in Dec’09 – Jan’10. The slower
imports points at weak domestic consumption determined by 
growth, feeble remittances’ inflow as well as shaky domestic currency
16). 
• From geographical perspective, the exports’ recovery was widely spread
Jan’10. Exports grew considerably in the case of majority of the most 
important destinations. The exports growth is the following from Russia 
westwards: Russia (+34.5%), Ukraine (+40.4%),
(+21.3%) and the U.K. (+27.3%). The only major exports destination in retreat 
were Belarus (-43.9%) and Romania (-8.5%
affected by falling exports of sugar, which overall shrank by 
large, the share held in Moldovan exports by the EU market increased to 
58.7% (57.3%), while the share held by the CIS declined to 31.7% (33.9%), 
, soaring inflationary pressures 
. This issue is getting worse since, 
create necessary conditions 
the Government has to improve 
ic stability and 
the most vexing issues of 
NPL share in total credit portfolio 
undermined the profitability 
their economic confidence. High 
15). Consequently, the volume of 
foreign trade fueled the demand of 
o account the relatively wide 
is 
 price” of the commercial 
-term liquidity and 38.29% for 
transmission 
Chart 14 Share of non
Source: NBM 
 
Chart 15 Bank interest rates, %, and spread, p.p.
Source: NBM 
stagnated (-1.65%), y-o-y. These 




 Germany (+64.4%), Italy 
), the latter being apparently 
92.5%. By and 
 
Chart 16 Annual foreign trade evolution
Jan’10, %, 2006=100.
Source: NBS, EG calculations.
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although Russia has entrenched its position on the top with 20.25% vs. 
Romania’s 16.6% share of the total exports. 
• Exports advanced significantly also across the range of products. The strongest 
advances were posted by vegetal products (+39.3%), chemicals (+205%), 
articles of stone, gypsum, cement, ceramic, glass or similar materials (+49.8%), 
etc. It is worthwhile to mention that even exports of metals heavily affected 
by the crisis showed signs of rebound (+43.4%). The exports of vehicles and 
other associated transport equipment rocketed, posting seven-fold growth. 
This growth however most probably will be short-lived, as it refers to export of 
some helicopter parts and re-export of tractors. The only important group of 
products that stumbled is “foodstuff products; alcoholic and non-alcoholic 
drinks; tobacco” (-13.25%), which was severely hit by declining sugar (-92%) 
and beverages (-15.7%) exports.   
• Imports still cannot post any growth y-o-y basis, being slightly lower in January 
2010 than a year ago. As opposite to exports, the strongest growth of imports 
comes from the countries where Moldovan exports plunged: Romania (+40%) 
and Belarus (+24.4%). The most spectacular hike in imports is from Russia 
(+544.7%), this evolution owes however to the fact that imports of natural gas 
that last year technically originated from Kazakhstan this year originate from 
Russia. 
 
GLOBAL ECONOMY AND MARKETS  
• The Greek crisis continued to be the bone of contention as the EU leaders 
searched for the solution that would not allow Greece to fail, but also would 
avoid setting the “moral hazard”-like precedent of the EU-paid bail-out for 
other profligate EU members (Chart 17). A tentative “last resort” (as opposed 
to “bail-out”) deal was apparently reached on March 25, 2010. The package 
consists of 22 bln. euros (there are various estimates of how much money 
Greece will need in mid-term perspective, The Economist, estimates that the 
country’s financing needs will shoot up to 75 billion euros; see The Economist, 
March 25, 2010), of which two-thirds are put up by the EU and the other third 
by the IMF, respectively. Worthwhile to note, Greece will only be able to 
access these funds if effectively fails to raise money on the international bond 
markets (Greece has to raise 18 billion euro by the end of May). Besides being 
“significant not only for Greece, but also for the stability of the eurozone” 
(Herman Van Rompuy), the deal will also keep under pressure Greece and 
other PIIGS governments to pursue fiscal austerity measures and “learn” the 
crisis lessons. 
• The global prices for oil remained extremely volatile throughout March due to 
extremely uncertain global economic outlook. While the OPEC decided to 
keep the extraction quotas unchanged, the exogenous factors continued 
pushing the oil prices in often opposite direction. On the downside, the 
protracted lack of progress by the EU leaders to reach the decision on aid 
package to be provided to Greece associated with weaker euro and stronger 
greenback, reduced the desire to invest in commodities. Furthermore, India’s 
(the second among the developing countries oil consumer after China) 
decision to jack up the interest rates also spread the antsiness among the 
investors fearing the slowing economic growth and feebler demand for oil in 
that country. On the upside, the aforementioned OPEC decision, the tensions 
in the Yellow Sea as well as tentative decision on the aid package for Greece 
supported upward trend on the oil market. In the near future prices variations 
for the crude are expected to stay wide open, from 90 USD per barrel (Societe 
Generale) to 73 USD per barrel (The EIU). 
 
Chart 17 Budget deficit and public debt as share of 
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STATISTICAL APPENDIXES 
Table 1 Moldova: monthly indicators 
 Jun’09 Jul’09 Aug’09 Sep’09 Oct’09 Nov’09 Dec’09 Jan’10 Feb’10 Mar’10 
Industrial production growth rate, y-o-y, % -23.2 -23.5 -23.1 -22.5 -22.6 -15.8 -15.7 5.0 3.4 n.a. 
Retail-trade growth rate, y-o-y, % -4.5 -6.0 -5.6 -2.9 -6.5 -2.1 -3.5 3.4 0.3 n.a. 
Services to population growth rate, y-o-y, % 2.9 0.4 4.7 9.3 2.5 4.8 4.3 8.1 8.5 n.a. 
Merchandise exports, million USD 107.6 111.1 97.9 106.3 124.9 138.5 92.8 84.5 n.a. n.a. 
Merchandise imports, million USD 259.7 264.8 233.9 286.2 304.6 329.3 241.4 198.6 n.a. n.a. 
Official reserve assets, million USD 1.210.1 1.182.6 1.302.5 1.290.5 1.302.5 1.374.5 1480.3 1466.1 1465.3 1473.2 
Registered unemployed, persons, beginning of 
the period 
35876 35066 35351 35838 36961 37398 38101 38676 41683 49054 
Real wage growth rate, % 3.4 4.1 5.6 9.7 2.9 4.3 4.4e 2.7 -0.1 n.a. 
Budget revenues growth rate, cumul. y-o-y, %  -10.2 -9.0 -9.3 -9.7 -9.6 -9.4 -9.2 5.8 6.3 n.a. 
Consumer prices growth rate, y-o-y, % - 0.8 -0.5 -2.2 -2.3 -1.6 -0.7 0.4 2.8 4.4 n.a. 
Exchange rate, end-period, MDL per USD 11.24 11.21 11.21 11.50 11.06 11.11 12.30 12.53 12.80 12.40 
Exchange rate, end-period, MDL per EUR 15.80 15.99 16.03 16.74 16.29 16.55 17.76 17.54 17.28 16.72 
Broad money (M2) growth rate, y-o-y, % -11.9 -14.7 -16.2 -15.5 -14.5 -10.1 -3.8 1.3 5.4 n.a. 
Central bank refinancing rate, end-period, % 9.0 8.0 7.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 6.0 6.5 6.5 
Bank deposit rate,  % 15.04 14.85 12.99 10.77 10.66 10.56 9.79 9.70 8.45 n.a. 
Bank lending rate, % 18.94 17.97 17.65 19.04 19.63 18.88 18.63 17.03 17.78 n.a. 
Banks liquid assets, % of total assets  31.46 32.79 33.53 34.53 34.03 35.57 38.27 38.10 38.29 n.a. 
Banks unfavorable credits, % of total credits 10.47 11.95 12.88 14.60 15.57 16.62 16.30 17.37 17.81 n.a. 
Currency deposits, % of total deposits 56.56 53.92 53.91 54.56 54.08 53.02 53.59 52.95 53.32 n.a. 
Source: NBS, NBM and EG calculations and estimates; 
Table 2 Moldova: key long-term economic indicators 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Population, million (excludes Transnistrian 
region) 
3.644 3.635 3.628 3.618 3.607 3.600 3.590 3.581 3.573 3.568 
GDP, billion USD, current prices 1.289 1.480 1.662 1.981 2.598 2.988 3.408 4.395 6.047 5.409 
GDP per capita, USD at PPP 2112 2300 2533 2765 2028 2362 2561 2715 2998 n.a. 
GDP growth rate, y-o-y, % 2.1 6.1 7.8 6.6 7.4 7.5 4.8 3.0 7.2 -6.5 
Private consumption growth rate, y-o-y, % 27.6 6.1 5.9 18.5 6.2 10.1 7.0 3.6 4.5 -7.9 
Gross fixed capital formation growth rate, y-o-y, 
% 
-0.7 5.2 1.1 19.2 11.0 17.7 2.8 10.5 -7.8 -37.2 
Industrial production growth rate, y-o-y, % 7,7 13,7 10,8 15.6 8.2 7,0 -4.8 -1.3 0.7 -22.2 
Agricultural production growth rate, y-o-y, % -3,3 6,4 3.4 -13.6 20.8 0.8 -1.1 -23.1 32.1 -9.9 
Share of industry in GDP, % 19.0 21.8 20.2 20.5 20.5 19.1 18.0 19.1 13.9 13.0 
Share of agriculture in GDP, % 25.4 22.4 21.0 18.3 17.5 16.4 14.8 10.0 8.8 8.5 
Merchandise exports, million USD 476.7 564.6 659.7 805.1 994.1 1104.6 1060.8 1373.3 1646.0 1321.5 
Merchandise imports, million USD 770.3 879.7 1037.5 1428.1 1748.2 2296.1 2644.4 3676.4 4866.3 3333.0 
Service exports, million USD 164.6 170.9 216.65 249.93 332.08 398.94 465.66 625.08 837.2 677.7 
Service imports, million USD 201.58 208.78 256.99 294.26 353.05 419.68 487.64 631.16 824.72 701.8 
Net foreign direct investment, million USD 127.46 103.32 83.6 73.64 147.8 190.86 234.16 522.04 691.49 112.0 
Net work remittances, million USD 148.4 202.8 286.3 440.2 659.5 868.8 1119.0 1419.4 1795.8 1342.4 
Current account/GDP, % -7.6 -1.7 -4.0 -6.6 -2.2 -8.1 -11.7 -15.2 -16.7 -8.6 
Official reserve assets, end-year, million USD 222.65 228.54 268.87 302.27 470.27 597.44 775.3 1333.7 1672.4 1480.3 
Total external debt stock, million USD 1723.7 1678.3 1816.5 1929.4 1881.8 2078.1 2528.9 3355.9 4106.1 4368.8 
External debt/GDP, % 116.8 113.4 109.3 97.5 72.5 69.6 74.3 76.3 67.9 80.8 
External debt/exports of goods and services, % 268.8 228.2 198.2 182.2 141.5 138.0 164.8 167.4 164.6 215.1 
Employment rate, % of population aged above 15 54.8 53.7 53.3 47.5 45.7 45.4 42.9 42.5 42.5 42.8 
Unemployment rate, % of economically active 
population  
8.5 7.3 6.8 7.9 8.1 7.3 7.4 5.1 4.0 6.4 
Real wage growth rate, y-o-y, % 2.2 21.6 20.9 15.4 10.1 6.8 14.2 8.0 10.2 9.0 
Consumer prices, year average, % 31.1 9.6 5.2 11.6 12.5 12.0 12.8 12.4 12.8 0.0 
General government balance, % of GDP -1.8 -0.3 -2.2 1.0 0.4 1.5 -0.3 -0.3 -1.0 -7.0 
General government expenditure, % of GDP 34.5 29.4 31.5 33.1 35.1 37.0 40.1 41.8 41.6 43.5 
Exchange rate, year average, MDL per USD 12.4 12.9 13.6 13.9 12.3 12.6 13.1 12.1 10.4 11.1 
Broad money (M2) growth rate, y-o-y, % 38.8 37.8 30.4 24.4 44.8 36.7 12.2 47.3 18.3 -3.8 
Central bank refinancing rate, end-year, % 27.0 13.0 9.5 14.0 14.5 12.5 14.5 16.0 14.0 5.0 
Total commercial bank loans, % of GDP 12.7 15.3 17.7 20.9 22.6 25.5 29.3 37.2 37.5 35.0 
Bank deposit rate, % 24.6 20.6 14.4 12.7 15.2 13.0 11.9 15.1 18.1 14.7 
Bank lending rate, % 33.3 28.5 23.1 19.2 21.0 18.9 18.2 18.9 21.0 20.3 
Source: NBS, IMF, NBM and EG calculations and estimates; 
